Beijing At A Loss On What To Do About Its Economic Challenges?

China’s annual “Two Sessions” conference has for decades revealed the party agenda to the faithful. This year’s meeting offered them little, a startling development given China’s huge economic and financial challenges – a property crisis, export shortfalls, demographic decline, a loss of confidence among consumers and private business owners, and growing hostility in foreign capitals. More than ever, China needs Beijing to act, to point the way to future action. The failure to address this need at the Two Sessions suggests that China’s leadership has run out of ideas.

Most telling was the absence of the traditional press conference. Every Two Sessions meeting has included a space for China’s leadership to interact with both domestic and foreign media. The senior men in government were not always forthcoming at these exchanges, but their evasive answers at least pointed out publicly what matters they considered touchy or awkward. When this year’s press conference was cancelled, one can only conclude that the good and the great in the Forbidden City worry about being embarrassed.

The authorities did announce a real growth target for 2024. They set it at “around 5 percent.” In one respect, this information can only be described as bland. It was expected and is very close to last year’s pace. In another respect, however, it confesses failure of a sort. It is, after all, barely over half the real growth rate China averaged up until 2019. And with all the problems, it is not clear that China can even make that rate. Last year the economy had a tailwind from pandemic recovery. None of that is in play in 2024. Meanwhile, the authorities never explained how they intended to achieve the growth.

Infrastructure spending was mentioned, one trillion yuan ($132.9 billion) worth of it. Infrastructure is China’s default form of economic stimulus. But little was said about how China would finance such spending. Local governments, the usual source of infrastructure financing, face huge debt overhangs, some so severe that they cannot even meet the public service needs of their populations. True, Beijing said it was ready to take the unusual step of issuing central government debt to finance the spending. But even that raises questions. The government already faces record high budget deficits. The emphasis on “ultra-long bonds” may hint at how difficult financial matters have become. Long maturities will delay the need to repay the debt and show that Beijing does not expect an immediate return from its spending.

Little was said about the property crisis with all its adverse economic and financial ramifications. Despite the need for bold action on this front, all Beijing has mustered so far are the “white lists” in which local governments compile a list of failing real estate projects for financing that the state-owned banks would review before advancing the funds. The amounts discussed so far, however, are tiny compared with the need, barely over 5 percent of Evergrande’s initial failure two and half years ago. Some weeks back, talk emerged about a plan for the government to take over some 30 percent of the housing market. Although such an action would have brought China other severe problems, it would have been big enough to disguise the property crisis. Nothing as bold or substantive as that got a hearing at the Two Sessions.

On China’s deflation problem, the authorities did indicate a target of 3 percent inflation for the year but said nothing about how they planned to achieve it. To be sure, deflation is more a symptom than a cause of the country’s challenges, which in part lie with inadequate demand for consumption and capital spending by private business, but neither did China’s leadership say much about these problems either. The only concrete suggestion was a promise by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) to cut interest rates more than the bank already has. Given the lack of an economic response to past rate cuts, this promise hardly seems an adequate answer. In any case, as soon as the conference ended, the PBOC at its own meeting decided against another interest rate cut.

Talk did center on new growth engines for the economy, what the conference referred to as “new productive sources.” There was little new here. Renewable energy, advanced technology, and electric vehicles led the list. Like so much else offered at the Two Sessions, the talk was all aspirational. No one suggested how China planned to promote these areas beyond what is already being done. Given the sorry state of China’s economy, that is not enough.

If the Two Sessions is supposed to announce a guide to China’s future, this year’s meeting missed its mission, especially in the face of China’s many economic and financial problems. Perhaps more complete and substantive guidance will emerge at next month’s politburo meeting, but given how the Two Sessions went, that seems unlikely. China’s leadership seems to have run out of ideas.